tripwire

The canary & the clock

Two instruments, one purpose: notice the end of elliptic-curve security before it notices you.

No canary is configured for this deployment. Create a fresh keypair, fund it with a small amount of SOL, then destroy the key (the funds become permanently unspendable). Set CANARY_ADDRESS and CANARY_BASELINE_LAMPORTS (or store the snapshot in the canary_snapshot table) and this panel becomes a live tripwire: if the balance ever changes, someone moved funds from a key nobody should have.

Monitoring polling is intentionally public — an alert here should be loud, everywhere, immediately. Quntra treats canary movement as a platform-wide emergency.

q-day clock — estimated time until a quantum computer can break ed25519

days

hours

minutes

seconds

Estimate maintained by the watchtower and adjusted as quantum-computing milestones land.

run your own canary

Generate a keypair on an air-gapped machine and fund it with a little SOL.
Destroy the key material, irrecoverably. The SOL becomes a monument.
Record the address + balance in canary_snapshot or the CANARY_* env vars.
If this page turns red, treat every classical key you own as compromised.

how it works

What happens if the canary turns red?+

It would mean funds moved from a key whose private key was provably destroyed — the only way that is possible is a break of ed25519 itself. Treat it as a platform-wide emergency: every classical key, everywhere, should be assumed derivable.

How reliable is the q-day estimate?+

It is a planning assumption, not a prophecy — anchored to expert-survey medians and moved as real milestones land (error-correction breakthroughs, logical qubit counts, standards decisions). The watchtower log tracks those signals.

Is the canary safe from accidental movement?+

Yes by construction: the key material no longer exists, so there is nothing to lose, leak, or misuse. The only event that changes the balance is a cryptographic break.